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FEDERAL WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION FOR
TRANSPORTATION EMPLOYEES
WALTER GELLHORN t
OvER twenty years ago a special commission of Congress, presided over
by Senator, now Justice, George Sutherland, advocated the adoption
of a workmen's compensation law applicable to employees of interstate
railroads.' Both Houses of Congress voted favorably on a proposal
to carry out the commission's recommendation; but minor disagreements
in details of the measure as adopted in the two Houses were seized upon
to foreclose passage of an act during that Congress,2 and the favorable
moment passed. Workmen's compensation for the railroads was side-
tracked.
The defeat then inflicted, engineered in large measure by lawyers
who refused to surrender the rich fee-bearing lode of personal injury
cases arising out of railroading,, might well have been viewed as a
fatal wound to the movement for a compensation act. And so perhaps
it would have been, had the substitute retained by Congress functioned
with even a fair degree of satisfaction. But the Federal Employers'
Liability Act has proved a failure, and recent efforts to improve it have
made no headway.4 The proposal for workmen's compensation again
comes to the fore as offering the most effective solution of the problem.
In the furtherance of this proposal, Senator Wagner of New York
will soon introduce in Congress a bill providing for a workmen's com-
pensation scheme.' Included within its terms, by Section 2(3), are all
employers
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1. Report of Commission to Investigate the Matter of Employers' Liability and
Workmen's Compensation, SEN. Doc. No. 338, 62d Cong., 2d Sess. (1912) Ser. No. 6151.
This report will hereafter be referred to as the Sutherland Commission Report.
2. The Senate, following a favorable report, SEN. REP. No. 553, 62d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1912) Ser. No. 6121, voted favorably on the bill (S. 5382) on May 6, 1912. (1912) 4S
CONG. REc. 5959. The House Committee reported the bill favorably with amendments, and
on March 1, 1913, the House adopted the Senate Bill as amended. (1913) 49 CONG. REc.
4547. Obstructionistic tactics in the Senate prevented action on Senator Sutherland's
motion that the Senate concur in the House amendments. See (1913) 49 CoNG. REc.
4562-4563, 4673-4675, 4676-4677.
3. Clark, Workmen's Compensation and the Railroads: A Hesitating Revolution
(1933) 41 J. POL. EcoN. 806, 807-809.
4. H. R. 10425, H. R. 11181, H. R. 11182, H. R. 11498, 72d Cong, 1st Sess. (1932).
See remarks on two of these bills in 75 CONG. REc. 12362-12363 (1932).
5. This bill has been prepared for Senator Wagner by the American Association for
Labor Legislation, in conjunction with the Legislative Drafting Research Fund of the




"engaged in interstate or foreign commerce as:
(1) A common carrier by railroad; or
(2) An express company or sleeping car or dining car company; or
(3) A pipeline company; or
(4) A common or contract carrier by air craft or any vehicle in commerce
between fixed termini or on a regular schedule or route."
Unlike earlier drafts introduced by Senator Wagner at recent sessions
of Congress,' the new bill brings within the scope of the compensa-
tion plan practically all employees of these different types of interstate
carriers. Section 3(a) provides that compensation shall be payable in
respect of disability or death of an employee incurred when he
"is in the service of an employer subject to this Act and is engaged:
(1) in transportation service; or
(2) in duties in or upon any agency or means of transportation; or
(3) in the operation, protection, construction, maintenance, repair, moving,
or inspection of any agency or means of transportation or of any structure,
track, right of way, road, field, equipment, appliance, or appurtenance used
or useful in connection with transportation."
7
The bill as a whole is modelled upon the Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act,' with such refinements as experience has
shown to be wise or as differences between the types of employments
necessitate. The section likely to be the most controversial from the
standpoint of its constitutionality is Section 3(a). By its terms em-
ployees are to be included within the protection of the compensation
law without reference to whether their activity is in interstate or intra-
state commerce or transportation at the time of their injury; the
application of the proposed statute will be conditioned upon the type
of service performed, rather than upon the interstate character of the
employment. Upon the validity of that classification much of the value
of the proposal dependsY
6. S. 1320, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933); S. 5695, 72d Cong., 2d Sess. (1933); S. 4927,
72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1932). An earlier bill, introduced by Representative LaGuardia, had
sought to provide workmen's compensation as to certain employments in interstate and
foreign air commerce. H. R. 141, 71st Cong., 1st Sess. (1929).
7, Section 3 (b) specifically excludes from the operation of the act (1) masters or
members of a crew of any vessel, (2) employees of any government, (3) persons entitled
to compensation under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' or the District of
Columbia compensation acts.
8. Act of March 4, 1927, c. 509, 44 STAT. 1424 (1927), 33 U. S. C. S-uPP. VII, §§ 901-950
(1933), as amended by the Act of May 4, 192S, c. 502, 45 STAT. 490 (1928), 33 U. S. C.
Supp. VII § 921 (a) (1933).
9. See Richberg, Workmen's Compensation for Railway Employees (1933) 23 AM. LAB.
Lns. REv. 51, 52, where Mr. Donald Richberg, a warm friend of the compensation prin-
ciple, expresses a possible doubt concerning the desirability of a federal law applicable only




The history of the Federal Employers' Liability Act is familiar. The
first Act' provided that every common carrier operating in interstate
commerce should be liable "to any of its employees" for damages re-
sulting from its negligence. This provision the Supreme Court declared
unconstitutional in The Employers' Liability Cases," on the ground
that it embraced employees in intrastate commerce and hence consti-
tuted an unwarranted extension of federal regulation. The second
Act,' 2 drafted to escape the fate of its predecessor, applied only to rail-
roads in interstate, territorial, or foreign commerce and extended only
to such employees of the carrier as suffered injury while they were
employed "in such commerce." Thus restricted, it was triumphantly
upheld by the Supreme Court in Mondou v. New York, New Haven &
Hartford Rr. Co.," and so launched upon a career marked by ceaseless
litigation, endless and inconclusive "interpretation," and failure to fulfill
the desired objective of protecting workmen in an especially hazardous
occupation.
The decisions in cases arising under the Federal Employers' Liability
Act have shown the extreme difficulty of determining whether or not
an employee was engaged in interstate commerce at the time he was
injured. 4 Indeed, the Court itself, through Mr. Justice McKenna, has
explicitly recognized and articulated the impossibility of establishing
any effective criterion for determining whether a case falls within the
terms of the Act.' This uncertainty results not only in an overcrowd-
ing of the dockets of appellate courts' 6 with a type of case that yields
no contribution to the progress of the law;' 7 it may also operate to
10. 34 STAT. 232 (1906).
11. 207 U. S. 463 (1908).
12. Act of April 22, 1908, c. 149, 35 STAT. 65 (1908), 45 U. S. C. §§ 51-59 (1926).
13. 223 U. S. 1 (1912).
14. See an excellent review of the cases in Schoene and Watson, Workmen's Compensa-
tion on Interstate Railways (1934) 47 HAgv. L. REv. 389, 399-407; and see Note (1933) 13
B. U. L. REv. 329. Examination of cases in the lower federal courts and in the appellate
courts of the states reveals the same bewildering confusion that is observed in the Supreme
Court holdings.
15. See Industrial Accident Commission v. Davis, 259 U. S. 182, 188 (1922).
16. See FRANxFURTER AND LANDIs, THE BusmNEss OF THE SUPRnEm COURT (1927) 206
et seq.; and see Message of President Taft, Sutherland Commission Report, supra note 1,
at 8.
17. For an especially trenchant demonstration that "the Supreme Court cultivates
sterile soil in this field of litigation," see Frankfurter and Landis, The Business of the
Supreme Court at October Term, 1931 (1932) 46 HAav. L. REv. 226, 240-253. Note par-
ticularly the authors' conclusion that "The deepest significance of these cases is the proof
they furnish of the futility of the Act itself. When the process of interpretation and
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deprive an injured workman of any recovery, by reason of his having
chosen the wrong forum in which to press his claim."8
Even if the case is clearly one falling within the Act, the injured em-
ployee, or the representatives of one who was killed in the course of his
employment, may have no assurance of success. Although the negli-
gence of the employer must be clearly established as in an ordinary
tort action,'9 the Act purports to abolish the defenses of contributory
negligence and the fellow-servant rule. Yet the consequence of Su-
preme Court decisions20 has been to resurrect them in the guise of a
vibrant application of the assumption of risk doctrine, and thus effectually
to remove the supposed safeguards against use of the common-law
defenses.21  The real fruit of the Supreme Court's interpretation of the
Act has been a recognition by the employer of the value of prolonging
litigation in a situation in which prompt settlement is typically essential
to prevent destitution and suffering among members of a class deprived
of their earning capacity and hence peculiarly likely to become public
charges. The road to final adjudication, it has recently been observed,22
has been "made longer and more expensive than it was before the Act,
application after twenty-five years still yields unabated litigation and reveals an apparent
growing inability upon the part of judges primarily intrusted with its administration to
know its meaning, surely the legislation has proven a failure." Id. at 249.
18. See Schneider, Federal Employers' Liability Act, Workmen's Compensation Act, or
Common Law-Which? (1922) 95 CENT. L. J. 118; Albertsworth and Cilella, A Proposed
"New Deal" for Interstate Railway Industrial Harms (1934) 28 ILL. L. REv. 587, 598-600;
Richberg, supra note 9. Compare Moore v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 54 Sup. Ct. 402
(1934), where, in the first paragraph of the complaint, plaintiff alleged that at the time
of injury he was employed in interstate commerce, and, in the second paragraph, that at
the time of injury he was employed in intrastate commerce.
19. See Pennsylvania Rr. Co. v. Chamberlain, 288 U. S. 333 (1933).
20. See, e.g., Toledo, St. Louis, and Western Rr. Co. v. Allen, 276 U. S. 165 (1928);
and see Northwestern Pacific Rr. Co. v. Bobo, 290 U. S. 499 (1934); Bernola v. Penn-
sylvania Rr. Co., 68 F. (2d) 172 (C. C. A. 3d, 1933); Blackley v. Powell, 68 F. (2d) 457 (C.
C. A. 4th, 1934).
21. See Comment (1932) 42 YALE L. J. 226; Note (1932) 32 COL. L. REv. 1384; Alberts-
worth and Cilella, supra note 18, at 591-595; Welman, Assumed Risk under the Federal
Employers' Liability Act (1928) 3 IND. L. J. 365; Peterson, The Joker in the Federal Em-
ployers' Liability Act (1915) 80 CENT. L. J. 5; cf. Aronson, Federal Employers' Liability
Act (1932) 2 Baxn'N. L. REv. 37. New hazards of railroading, not within the scope of
safety appliances acts, such as the severe jolting resulting from slack action of heavily-
laden and excessively long freight trains, are frequent causes of injury [cf. Arguments
for and Against Limitation of Length of Freight Trains (1916) BUR. or Rr. EcoN., Bull.
No. 92] and are usually regarded as among the accepted risks of employment. See Richberg,
Advantages of a Federal Compensation Act for Railway Employees (1931) 21 Alf. LAB.
LEG. REv. 401, 402.
22. See Comment (1932) 42 YALE L. J. 226, 233; see also Schoene and Watson, supra
note 14, at 40S-409.
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with the added probability that should the employee's case reach the
Supreme Court he will lose. These facts have furnished the railroads
a powerful weapon by which they may force disadvantageous settlements
from their employees." 23
To the above criticisms of the functioning of the Federal Employers'
Liability Act may be added the further charge that recoveries are
inadequate to compensate employees for their losses. While it is un-
doubtedly true that large verdicts or settlements are frequently obtained
in death and serious injury cases, the fact is that, wholly apart from
cases in which there is failure of proof of the right to recovery,2 4 the
mass of claimants receive less than the amount that would have been
theirs under a compensation award.2 5 Lawyers' fees and expenses of
litigation consume much of what is recovered, and in many classes of
injury the injured man must contemplate no recovery at all or a settle-
23. Recent cases in the Supreme Court attest to the long delays often experienced
in this type of litigation. See, e.g., Chicago and Northwestern Ry. Co. v. Bolle, 284 U.
S. 74 (1931) (nine years after injury, judgment entered in the Supreme Court dismissing
plaintiff's suit); Baltimore and Ohio Rr. Co. v. Carroll, 280 U. S. 491 (1930) (thirteen
year interval between commencement and termination of the action).
Under present conditions, moreover, there is no assurance that state workmen's com-
pensation laws, where applicable to railroad employees, will be permitted to function with
their accustomed celerity. In Chicago & Eastern Illinois Rr. Co. v. Industrial Commission,
284 U. S. 296 (1932), the judgment of the Supreme Court was rendered two years after
the employee filed with the State Commission a claim for compensation. The facts of
the injury were not in dispute; the delay was occasioned by the employer's insistence
that the worker was employed in interstate commerce when injured. The Supreme Court
finally rejected this contention.
24. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Rr. Co. v. Chamberlain, supra note 19; Atchison, Topeka
& Sante Fe Ry. Co. v. Saxon, 284 U. S. 458 (1932); New York, New Haven & Hartford
Rr. Co. v. Bezue, 284 U. S. 415 (1932).
25. Mr. L. F. Loree, president of the Delaware & Hudson Railroad Corporation, con-
tends that not only do injured employees and their dependents receive less than under
compensation laws, but also that the railroads pay more than they should in justice
be required to pay. See Loree, Railway Employer Favors Workmen's Compensation (1933)
23 Am. LAB. LEG. RFV. 110. Cf. Sutherland Commission Report, supra note 1, at 23-24, 85-
86; and see Clark, supra note 3, at 809-810. Strong support for this view is found in a study
of a strictly analogous situation undertaken by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Seamen are
excepted from the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, though included
in the bill as originally drawn. By the Act of June 5, 1920, c. 250, § 33, 41 STAT. 1007
(1920), 46 U. S. C. § 688 (1926), "all statutes of the United States modifying or extending
the common-law right or remedy in cases of personal injury to railway employees," are made
applicable in actions brought by seamen. A survey showed that injured seamen actually
gained less and the employers paid more money than if the former had been compensated
for injury on the basis of the schedules enacted by Congress in 1927 for other marine
workers. See Settlement for Accidents to American Seamen (1928) U. S. BUR. or" Lan.
STAT., Bull. 466; Id. (1928) 26 Mox. LAB. REv. (No. 6) 6. And see Albertsworth and
Cilella, supra note 18, at 789.
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ment dependent on the employer's largesse.2" The rules of many rail-
roads provide that institution of suit against the company operates
automatically to terminate the plaintiff's employment, and where the
injury is relatively slight, fear of loss of employment as well as the
cost of the suit prevents the bringing of an action. Since the congres-
sional enactment bars recourse to state compensation laws,2 7 a large
number of these industrial accidents result in direct burdens upon the
community at large, rather than upon the industry in which they
occurred.
II
The growing recognition that the Liability Act cannot function effec-
tively in the field of interstate railroad injuries has provoked advocacy
of appropriate remedial legislation. The late Chief Justice Taft gave
vigorous expression to the need of a federal compensation law.2 More
recently, two thoughtful studies of the problem have appeared, one
discussing amendment -within the framework of the existing Act 29 and
the other urging the repeal of the Act and the remission of the whole
question to the individual states3 0
The proposal for reform through amendment rather than by a wholly
new approach to the problem may be summarily dismissed, for, as has
been indicated, the operation of the Act has revealed its deficiencies as
a remedial or protective measure. Retention of such a discredited
legislative plan is certainly not necessitated by any constitutional re-
26. Cf. Hearings held before the Sutherland Commission, SEN. Doc. No. 338, 62d Cong.,
2d Sess. (1912) Ser. No. 6152, at 1055-1056.
27. See New York Central Rr. Co. v. Winfield, 244 U. S. 147 (1917); cf. Boston &
BMaine Rr. Co. v. Armburg, 285 U. S. 234 (1932), discussed at p. 912, infra.
28. See Address to the American Law Institute, May 9, 1929, published in (1929) 15
A. B. A. J. 332-333.
29. Albertsworth and Cilella, supra note 18. The authors do not, however, commit
themselves to approval of retention of the tort basis of the Act. They mention, but do
not necessarily advocate, attempted restriction of the defense of assumed risk in death
cases; possible extension of the coverage of the Act; creation of a cause of action for
occupational diseases; erection of a conclusive presumption that, where an employee is
found deceased on the premises of the employer, the employee exercised due care and
the rail employer was negligent; and a rule that assumed risk would not bar recovery, but
merely diminish the damage recoverable.
In a second installment of their article, 28 ILL. L. Rav. 774 (1934), the same authors con-
sider and reject the possibility of returning to the states the power to legislate with refer-
ence to injuries suffered by railroad employees. They favor a "limited federal compensation
act, restricted to the interstate acts of rail employees." Id. at 788.
30. Schoene and Watson, supra note 14, at 411-422; cf. Richberg, supra note 9. H. R.
12170, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1932), provided that the Workmen's Compensation Law of
any state might apply, within that state, to employments in interstate commerce. The
measure was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary which never reported it out.
19341
YALE LAW JOURNAL
requirement or prohibition. The alternatives are twofold: (1) Complete
abdication of congressional control; (2) Formulation of a federal work-
men's compensation plan devised, as is the bill under discussion, to avoid
the defects of the present system.31
State control is subject to the disadvantage that four states, Arkansas,
Florida, Mississippi, and South Carolina, have no compensation acts
at all, that many other states provide ludicrously small benefits, and
that numerous existing acts would require amendment or additions
before being applicable to the employees now subject to the Federal
Employers' Liability Act.32
Further serious obstacles may be suggested. It ,is not at all clear
that the states could, without creating what would be held to constitute
an unconstitutional burden upon interstate commerce, devise a prac-
ticable scheme for providing insurance for the workers on interstate
railroads. Railroad workers may be and frequently are employed in
more than one state. The deposit of securities or the posting of a
bond or the purchase of insurance in each of the states, in an amount
adequate to safeguard the maximum number of employees who might
there be engaged in work at any given moment, might prove too onerous
an expense. No decision of the Supreme Court has dissipated fear
of that possibility. In Boston & Maine Railroad Co. v. Armburg,'
it is true, it was held that the Massachusetts compensation law was
valid, even though it required railroad companies to undertake the
difficult task of computing the number of employees within that state
who were not within the reach of the Federal Act. But the basis of
Mr. Justice Stone's opinion is the same as that recently noted in cases
arising under the due process clause, namely, that the party attacking
the statute had failed to prove the facts upon which his attack was
founded.34  The decision does not foreclose consideration of the ques-
tion on a more ample record. Moreover, whether constitutional or not,
enforced compliance by interstate railroads with the diverse laws of all
the states would prove burdensome in fact and might compel a read-
justment of rates to cover the added expense.
31. Albertsworth and Cilella advocate the earlier Wagner plan, limited in its coverage
much as is the present Liability Act. This plan would perpetuate the recurrent problem,
already noted, of determining whether an employee was engaged in inter- or intrastate
transportation when injured. That problem, with its implications of litigation, might well
destroy the effectiveness of the compensation principle.
32. See and compare Schoene and Watson, supra note 14, at 411-422.
33. Supra note 27.
34. Id. at 240: ". . . it is not self-evident that the Act is unworkable, and there is
nothing on the record which would enable us to say that such allocation is either impossible
or so difficult as necessarily to impose any burden on interstate commerce. . . . There are
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Another substantial objection to relegating the accident compensa-
tion question to the states is found in the conflict of laws problems
inherent in typical railroad employments. The resident of one state
may make a contract for his services in a second and may proceed to
perform that contract in half a dozen other states. Determination of
what law governs when accidents occur in interstate movements may
prove as difficult as has solution of the interstate-intrastate question
raised by the Liability Act." An, incentive to litigation of that question
would remain so long as the compensation benefits of one state statute
were greater than those obtainable under another.36 Difficulties of the
kind here indicated, however, might possibly be diminished by some
type of congressional formulation of venue provisions, in the event state
workmen's compensation acts were made applicable to all transportation
employees. Similarly, Congress might consent to the burden on inter-
state commerce resulting from the application of diverse insurance re-
quirements.
no findings and the petitioner asked no ruling with respect to the point. There is no
evidence from which it could be inferred that the allocation could not be made or that
insurance could not be effected at a cost bearing a fair relation to the intrastate service to
which the Act applies. The burden was on petitioner, who assailed the statute, to establish
its unconstitutionality. O'Gorman & Young, Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 282 U. S. 251;
Hardware Dealers Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Glidden Co., 284 U. S. 151, 158." Cf. Pacific
Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Seattle, 54 Sup. Ct. 383 (1934).
35. Bradford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U. S. 145 (1932), has by no means
eliminated the problems springing from conflicting statutes. Cf. Schoene and Watson, supra
note 14, at 413, n. 131. Compare with the Bradford Electric Co. case, Ohio v. Chattanooga
Boiler & Tank Co., 289 U. S. 439 (1933); and cf. Esau v. Smith Bros., 124 Nib. 217, 246
N. W. 230 (1933); Daggett v. Kansas City Structural Steel Co., 65 S. W. (2d) 1036 (Mo.
1933); and Migues' Case, 281 Mass. 373, 183 N. E. 847 (1933). See Dwan, Workmen's
Compensation and the Conflict of Laws (1927) 11 MiNx. L. REv. 329; Note (1933)
10 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 518; Note (1932) 46 HARv. L. REV. 291. See also Cameron v. Ellis
Construction Co., 252 N. Y. 394, 169 N E. 622 (1930); Proper v. Polley, 259 N. Y. 516,
182 N. E. 161 (1932), aff'g 233 App. Div. 621, 253 N. Y. Supp. 530 (3d Dep't 1931), noted
in (1932) 32 COL. L. REV. 1427; Smith v. Aerovane Utilities Corp., 259 N. Y. 126, 181
N. E. 72 (1932), noted in (1933) 27 ILL. L. Rav. 571.
36. While it is true that uniformity is not desirable per se in every type of social legis-
lation, it would appear that much is to be said in its favor in the present connection.
Elimination of the litigation suggested in the text would alone he strongly persuasive of
the merits of a uniform rule. Likewise the consequences of the litigation may create a
discontent that will continue long beyond the duration of the controversy. Cf. Hearings,
supra note 26, at 1034-1037. Consider, for example, the case of a railroad operating from
a division point like Meadville, Pennsylvania. The runs from that point extend on the
one side into New York and on the other into Ohio, while still others remain wholly within
Pennsylvania. It may very possibly occur that men employed in the same class of work
may be injured in the same manner and to the same degree, and yet, though neighbors
in Meadville, receive varying amounts of compensation.
Mention may also be made of the possible amplification and perfection of efforts toward
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These difficulties may be eliminated by a federal act, assuring workers
general, prompt, and precise protection against destroyed or diminished
earning power. The advocacy of legislation other than of the type
contemplated by the new bill rests at least in part, however, upon the
fear that a federal compensation act might be unconstitutional if broad
enough in its application to avoid the problems observed in the present
Liability Act. That is, some doubt is expressed as to whether a federal
statute can be made applicable no only to workers who are employed
in interstate commerce, but to the much broader category of workers
subject to the hazards of the transportation industry.
37
III
In the quarter of a century that has elapsed since the Supreme Court
declared unconstitutional the first Federal Employers' Liability Act,
accident prevention under a federal system. Accident prevention is generally recognized as one
of the most valuable products of workmen's compensation laws, although some state com-
missions are less acute than others in grasping the opportunities. The laggard and back-
ward states would not be in a position to affect a federal program. But cf. dissatisfaction
on this score with the administration of the Longshoremen's Act. Cochrane, A Halting
Commission (1931) 21 Am. LAB. LEG. REV. 399.
37. See, e.g., Albertsworth and Cilella, supra note 29, at 787. Schoene and Watson
suggest in additioil, supra note 14, at 423-424, that Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22 (1932),
would prevent effective administration of a compensation act. They believe that the
decision in that case, requiring a trial de novo of certain issues already decided by the
administrative agency hearing the case, would destroy one of the chief advantages of a
compensation law, i.e. expeditious disposition of claims. The fear would seem justified only
if a new compensation act were to be as limited in its application as is the present Liability
Act. The Supreme Court itself, in any event, has given soml indication that Crowell v.
Benson will not be wheeled into action except in most exceptional circumstances. See
Voehl v. Indemnity Insurance Co. of North America, 288 U. S. 162 (1933); L'Hote
v. Crowell, 286 U. S. 528 (1932). Moreover, examination of recent decisions in the
lower Federal courts does not disclose that Crowell v. Benson has in fact played
an obstructive role in the administration of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
Act. See Ocean Steamship Co. v. Lawson, 68 F. (2d) 55 (C. C. A. 5th, 1933); Harris v.
Hoage, 66 F. (2d) 801 (App. D. C. 1933); Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Hoage, 65
F. (2d) 822 (App. D. C. 1933); Texas Employers' Insurance Association v. Sheppeard,
62 F. (2d) 122 (C. C. A. 5th, 1932); Todd Dry Docks, Inc. v. Marshall, 61 F. (2d) 671
C. A. 1st, 1932); Baltimore & Ohio Rr. Co. v. Parker, 4 F. Supp. 815 (D. Md. 1933);
C. A. 9th, 1932); Powell v. Hoage, 57 F. (2d) 766 (App. D. C. 1932); Bethlehem Ship-
building Corp. v. Monahan, 57 F. (2d) 217 (D. Mass. 1932), aff'd, 62 F. (2d) 299 (C.
C. A. 1st, 1932); Baltimore & Ohio Rr. Co. v. Parker, 4 F. Supp. 815 (D. Md. 1933);
Employers' Liability Association Corp. v. Hoage, 67 F. (2d) 227 (App. D. C. 1934). Cf.
Baltimore & Ohio Rr. Co. v. Clark, 59 F. (2d) 595 (C. C. A. 4th, 1932); Continental
Casualty Co. v. Lawson, 2 F. Supp. 459 (S. D. Fla. 1932), rev'd, 64 F. (2d) 802 (C. C. A.
5th, 1933). See Note (1934) 43 YALE L. J. 640, 645. See also Note (1933) 46 HS. v. L.
RFv. 478; Note (1932) 30 MicH. L. REV. 1312.
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the trend of legislation has been definitely toward centralization of
functions in the federal government. The decisions of the Supreme
Court have kept pace with this legislative recognition of governmental
exigencies. With the exception of its refusal to sanction congressional
control of the shipment of goods made in factories employing children,
the Court has been constant in its approval of statutes passed in the
exercise of the power to regulate commerce among the states.
A concomitant of the development of federal control has been an
awakened recognition of the fact that characteristically intrastate
matters may fall within the ambit of congressional power. No new
principle was involved, for it has long been agreed that Congress is
authorized to enact whatever legislation is appropriate to protect or
promote interstate commerce and the instrumentalities by which it is
carried on." There has seemed to be, however, a more acute realiza-
tion of the nexus between state and federal concerns. Wherever the
relationship of matters of intrastate commerce and interstate commerce
has been thought to be so close as to affect the latter, federal control
of the former has been sanctioned. The rate cases are familiar ex-
amples30  Similarly, the Supreme Court has approved of federal orders
regarding abandonment or maintenance of railroad branch lines lying
wholly within one state; 40 a federal statute regulating a local board of
trade dealing in grain futures; 4' a federal penalty for disposing of
stolen automobiles;4 " and the restraining of intrastate activities which
affect the flow of interstate commerce.
43
In the realm of transportation employment, Congress has been held
competent to establish safety-appliance regulations applicable both to
interstate and intrastate traffic; 44 to prescribe rules of liability to workers
injured by reason of defective or prohibited equipment on either inter-
38. See Mobile County v. Kimball, 102 U. S. 691, 697 (1881); The Daniel Ball, 10
WalI. 557, 564 (U. S. 1871).
39. See Houston, E. & W. T. Ry. Co. v. United States, 234 U. S. 342 (1914); Railroad
Commission of Wisconsin v. Chicago, B. & Q. Rr. Co., 257 U. S. 563 (1922); New York
v. United States, 257 U. S. 591 (1922); Louisiana v. United States, 284 U. S. 125 (1931).
And see United States v. Louisiana, 290 U. S. 70 (1933).
40. See Transit Commission v. United States, 284 U. S. 360 (1932); Colorado v. United
States, 271 U. S. 153 (1926); cf. Texas v. Eastern Texas Rr. Co., 258 U. S. 204 (1922).
41. Chicago Board of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U. S. 1 (1923); and see Stafford v. Wallace,
258 U. S. 495 (1922); United States v. Ferger, 250 U. S. 199 (1919).
42. See Brooks v. United States, 267 U. S. 432 (1925); and cf. Hipolite Egg Co. v.
United States, 220 U. S. 45 (1911).
43. See Local 167, International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 54 Sup.
Ct. 396 (1934). And see Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Stone Cutters' Association, 274 U. S.
37, 46-47 (1927) ; Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U. S. 197 (1904).
44. See Southern Railway v. United States, 222 U. S. 20 (1911).
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state or intrastate trains;4 5 and to provide for the safety of employees
by limitations of the hours of service in either class of commerce."
Its power to regulate the wages of all railroad employees, to prohibit
railroads from influencing the selection of employee representatives
under the Railway Labor Act, and to insist upon appropriate ashpans
and safe boilers on locomotives, has not been questioned on the score
that the exercise of the power extended in some measure to intrastate
matters.
4 7
The question in each case is one of. fact. Is the regulation of intra-
state commerce required to further and perfect the regulation of inter-
state commerce? 48 The Safety Appliances Act was upheld as to
intrastate cars because the activities of the transportation business made
it clear that the security of interstate commerce could not be advanced
unless all rolling stock carried uniform approved equipment. The
Hours of Labor Act was approved because excessive hours in intrastate
activity would destroy the beneficent and protective purpose of restrict-
ing the hours of occupation in interstate commerce. Similarly, when
wage-regulation was shown to be required in an emergency, the inter-
relationship of all types of railroad employment was so clear as to
preclude the possibility of assuring continuity of service by only a
partial regulation. Indeed, Mr. Justice Van Devanter, writing for the
Court in the Second Employers' Liability Cases49 and again in Illinois
Central Railroad Co. v. Behrens5° has indicated that the present
45. Texas and Pacific Ry. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U. S. 33 (1916); see also Ward v. Erie
Rr. Co., 230 N. Y. 230, 129 N. E. 886 (1921), cert. den., 256 U. S. 696 (1921).
46. Baltimore & Ohio Rr. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 221 U. S. 612 (1911).
47. See Wilson v. New, 243 U. S. 332 (1917); Texas & New Orleans Rr. Co. v.
Brotherhood of Railway and Steamship Clerks, 281 U. S. 548 (1930); Ash Pan Act of
May 30, 1908, c. 225, 35 STAT. 476 (1908), 45 U. S. C. §§ 17-21 (1926) ; Boiler Inspection
Act of Feb. 17, 1911, c. 103, 36 STAT. 913 (1911), 45 U. S. C. §§ 22-34 (1926), as fre-
quently amended; Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Donaldson, 246 U. S. 121 (1918); Baltimore
& Ohio Rr. Co. v. Groeger, 266 U. S. 521 (1925); see especially Napier v. Atlantic Coast
Line Rr. Co., 272 U. S. 605 (1926). And see Hassenauer, Congressional Legislation Affect-
ing Railroad Employees (1933) 8 NomaR DAxaN LAW. 429.
48. Declarations and findings by Congress are of great weight in inducing the Court
to approve hn affirmative answer to that question. See Chicago Board of Trade v.
Olsen, supra note 41. And it may be noted here that the burden of proof would seem
to be on the party seeking to show that the answer should be negative. See Stafford
v. Wallace, supra note 41, at 521: ". . . it is primarily for Congress to consider and
decide the fact of the danger and meet it. This court will certainly not substitute its
judgment for that of Congress in such a matter unless the relation of the subject to
interstate commerce and its effect upon it are clearly nonexistent." Cf. Florida v. United
States, 282 U. S. 194 (1931).
49. 223 U. S. 1, 48 (1912).
50. 233 U. S. 473, 477 (1914). And see the opinion of Chief Judge Cardozo in
Carey v. New York Central Rr. Co., 250 N. Y. 345, 355, 165 N. E. 805, 808 (1929).
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Federal Employers' Liability Act is unnecessarily restricted in its ap-
plication only to those employees whose service at the time of injury
was in interstate commerce. A railway, he observed, is a highway for
both types of commerce, interdependent as to safety and movement,
and there is great practical difficulty in separating the general work of
train crews into one compartment or the other; hence, Congress might
have chosen to have regard for the general character of the employee's
work, rather than for the precise nature of his occupation at the moment
of misfortune. This suggestion is but further recognition of the rule
that Congress may in its discretion legislate to whatever extent is neces-
sary to make effective its control over interstate commerce.
The decisions under the Federal Employers' Liability Act themselves
demonstrate the link that binds to interstate commerce the employees
of the categories enumerated in the proposed bill. Their work is inter-
changeably in the two classes of commerce; their functions, whether
wholly within one state" or in several, are precedent conditions to the
flow of goods and passengers. They are of a class especially trained
for the tasks performed; the workers in the repair shop, the watchmen,
the yard clerks, and all the other groups constitute a pool of labor from
which are drawn the momentary needs of interstate commerce. What-
ever affects the personnel or efficiency of that pool" is within the power
51. The Wagner Bill does not purport to embrace within its terms employees of a
company who are engaged in some local activity not intimately related to the movement
of commerce. Cf. Delaware, L. & W. Ry. Co. v. Yurkonis, 238 U. S. 439 (1915), where
a miner employed in a coal mine owned by the railroad, suing to recover for injuries
received in an explosion in the mine, was held not to be engaged in interstate commerce,
although the coal might be used in the conduct of interstate commerce after it was
mined. Nor does the bill cover resident office or building employees, whose accident
hazards are not of a kind special to the transport htion industry and who may readily
be made compensable under state laws for such injuries as they may suffer in the course
of their employment. The accident reports show that members of this class, though
numerous, suffer casualties with relative infrequency. Accident Bull. No. 101 (I. C. C.,
Bur. of Statistics, 1933) 16. A section of the new bill provides that "Nothing in
this act shall be construed as restricting in any way the application to employers subject
to this act of the laws of any state providing rules of liability or compensation for dis-
ability or death suffered by employees not covered by the provisions of this act." The
section should foreclose any contention that Congress, by legislating as to some employees
and not others, intended "to occupy the whole field." Cf. Oregon-Washington Rr. &
Navigation Co. v. Washington, 270 U. S. 87 (1926); and see the Act of April 13, 1926,
44 STAT. 250 (1926), 7 U. S. C. Sum'. VII § 161 (1933), which was passed to overcome
the effect of that decision.
52. It may be estimated that in the past winter, a period of less than customary em-
ployment, over one million persons were employed by the railroads, Pullman Company,
dining car companies, and express companies in some aspect of rail transportation service
or in the maintenance of way, structures, equipment, and stores. See WAGE STATISTics
OF CLASS I STAm RAILwAYs IN THE UNITED STATES, DEC. 1933 (I. C. C., Bur. of Statistics,
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of Congress to govern. Even those employees of the named categories
who might never be engaged, as the Court has defined the term, in
interstate commerce or in work so closely related thereto as to be a
part of it, are appropriate objects of federal concern, for upon their
continued service rests much of the burden of keeping open the high-
ways of travel and of maintaining and protecting the equipment to be
used on those highways." In truth, the coverage of the Wagner Bill
is but an adaptation of the suggestion contained in Illinois Central Rail-
1934); 1. C. C. Release, March 6, 1934; PsRmuNARY ABsTRAcT or STATiSTiCS OF COm-
MON CARRIERS FOR 1932 (I. C. C., Bur. of Statistics, 1933) 31, 33; STATISTICS OF RAILwAYS
IN THE UITED STATES FOR 1931 (I. C. C., Bur. of Statistics, 1932) S-17, S-19. Em-
ployees of Pullman or express companies are not covered by the present Liability Act. See
Robinson v. Baltimore & Ohio Rr. Co., 237 U. S. 84 (1915); Wells, Fargo & Co. v. Taylor,
254 U. S. 175 (1920). During the ten year period, January 1, 1923 to December 31, 1932, the
numbers of railroad employees (exclusive of Pullman, express company, and like employees)
killed and injured in each year were as follows:
Year ended Killed Injured
Dec. 31, 1923 2,026 152,678
Dec. 31, 1924 1,543 125,319
Dec. 31, 1925 1,599 119,224
Dec. 31, 1926 1,672 111,903
Dec. 31, 1927 1,570 88,223
Dec. 31, 1928 1,329 70,873
Dec. 31, 1929 1,428 60,739
Dec. 31, 1930 977 35,872
Dec. 31, 1931 677 23,358
Dec. 31, 1932 579 17,742
Accident Bull. No. 101, supra note 51, at 81. The figures do not cover all accidents
resulting in injury to an employe. Id. at 86. The decline in casualties may be attributed
in part to reduction in volume of business handled. For example, the tons of freight
originated by Class I railways dropped 22.46 per cent between 1930 and 1931, while there
has been a marked, though not altogether steady, decrease in the number of tons carried
annually during the period 1923-1931. See STATisTics or RAILwAYS IN THE UNrED STATES
FOR 1931, op. cit. supra, S-40, S-41. This factor does not, however, account for the whole
decline. In 1923, the number of employees in service per employee injured was only twelve;
in 1932 the number had risen to sixty. Accident Bull. No. 101, supra note 51, at 81. The
number of trainmen in service per trainman injured was even smaller, being ten in 1923 and
thirty-one in 1932. Ibid.
53. See cases cited in notes 44, 45, and 46, supra. Extended citation of cases showing
the nexus between intrastate employments and the needs of interstate commerce is deemed
unnecessary. Reference may be made to the discussion in Schoene and Watson, supra
note 14. One of many examples is Erie Rr. Co. v. Welsh, 242 U. S. 303 (1916), where
an employee was injured en route to the yardmaster's office; if he had arrived safely,
he would have been given orders to make up an interstate train. Similarly, in Minneapolis
& St. Louis Rr. Co. v. Winters, 242 U. S. 353 (1917), an engine repairman was incapacitated
from serving the needs of interstate locomotives. In Chicago & Eastern Illinois Rr. Co.
v. Industrial Commission, supra note 23, the injured employee's work affected the supplying
to interstate locomotives of the fuel without which they could not move.
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road Co. v. Behrens;54 it goes further only in that it establishes a general
definition, operative regardless of the particular facts of the individual
case. In view of the administrative difficulties and the cost of determin-
ing in each instance whether a man's past or future services might play
a part in interstate commerce, and of the desirability of a speedy,
almost automatic settlement of claims for injuries, 5 it would seem clear
that occasional anomalies should not invalidate the proposed scheme.
What may be characterized as the "rule of administrative necessity" is
well established by the Supreme Court's decisions. 6
It may be conceded that the view here urged would necessitate at
least a substantial departure from the First Employers' Liability Cases,
though clearly the Wagner proposal is not so broad as the Act there
condemned. But it must be recalled that the approach of the Court
in the earlier case was not a factual one, nor was such an approach
urged upon it. The difficulties illustrated by the operation of the present
Act were not then appreciated. A change of result, it is now recog-




What has been said as to railroads and their satellite agencies would
seem equally applicable to the other types of transportation activity
included in the Wagner Bill. The carriers enumerated in Section 2(3)
are, save for the water carriers which may better be dealt with in a statute
limited to maritime concerns, the chief commercial competitors of the
railroads. The whole trend of government regulation is toward co-
54. Supra note 50.
55. Representatives of the carriers, appearing before the Sutherland Commission long
before the abundant flowering of perplexities under the Federal Employers' Liability Act,
recognized the necessity and desirability of extending the proposed compensation act to
others than "interstate" employees. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 26, at 1043, 1038-1039,
1020-1021.
56. See, e.g., Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U. S. 678 (1888); Purity Extract & Tonic
Co. v. Lynch, 226 U. S. 192 (1912); Jacob Ruppert v. Caffey, 251 U. S. 264 (1920);
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365 (1926); Milliken v. United States, 283 U. S.
15 (1931). Cf. Hoeper v. Tax Commission, 284 U. S. 206 (1931); Heiner v. Donnan,
285 U. S. 312 (1932).
57. See Abie State Bank v. Bryan, 282 U. S. 765 (1931); (1931) 40 YALE L. J. 1101;
People v. Charles Schweinler Press, 214 N. Y. 395, 108 N. E. 639 (1915); and see Note
(1933) 42 YALE L. J. 1250. The Supreme Court has reversed itself frequently when
further consideration cast doubt on previous rulings. See the dissenting opinion of Mr.
Justice Brandeis in Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U. S. 393, 405 (1932); Sharp,
Movemnent in Supreme Court Adjudication-A Study of Modified and Overruled Decisions
(1933) 46 HARv. L. REv. 361, 593, 795.
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ordination of the transportation facilities of the country, 5 and the
present proposal is conformable with that tendency.
The interstate movement of goods and passengers by truck and bus is
increasingly important, 9 and presents numerous problems resembling or
affecting those noted in rail transport. The proposed bill, contemplating
the administrative difficulties involved, as well as the hardship imposed
on those who, because of sporadic and unexpected engagements in inter-
state commerce, might be compelled to insure under both state and
federal acts, is limited to common or contract 0 carriers operating between
fixed termini or on a regular schedule or route.6 Motor transport of
this type is marked by peculiar hazards, arising, for example, from
efforts to maintain schedules en route on crowded highways, from bad
employment conditions and overly long hours of service, from use of
vehicles not adapted to the purpose for which they are used, and from
the frequent transportation of explosives and inflammable liquids. 2 The
largely interstate character of many of the operations vitiates effective
state regulation.63 Financial irresponsibility'is especially marked among
58. See, e.g., Report of the I. C. C. on Coordination of Motor Transport, 182 I. C. C.
263 (1932) ; Report of the Federal Coordinator of Transportation on Regulation of Trans-
portation Agencies, Sr. Doc. No. 152, 73d Cong., 2d sess. (1934).
59. The I. C. C. Report, supra note 58, shows that in 1929 the volume of trucking in
ton miles was six per cent of rail traffic and four per cent of all inland traffic; the percent-
ages are thought to be higher at present. Id. at 274-275, Appendix B, at 400-407. Five per
cent of all trucking is by common carriers in interstate commerce, and seven and a half per
cent by contract carriers in interstate commerce. Id. at 274-275. Intercity bus traffic, of
which in 1930 about twenty-five per cent was interstate, accounted for the movement
of over seventy per cent as many passengers as the railroads, though for a shorter average
distance. Id. at 277, 278, 377, 379. Steam and electric railroads, through subsidiaries or
affiliates, operate motor carriers as substitutes for or supplements to train service, or
entirely independently of rail operations. Id. at 319, 345, 348 et seq., Appendix A, at
395, 400.
60. There would seem to be no constitutional difficulty, other than that discussed in
this paper, involved in this type of regulation of contract carriers. Cf. Brown and Scott,
Regulation of thre Ccmtract Motor Carrier under the Constitution (1931) 44 HAuv. L.
Rxv. 530, 566; Rosenbaum and Lilienthal, Motor Carrier Regulation: Federal, State and
Municipal (1926) 26 CoL. L. REV. 954.
61. Report of I. C. C., supra note 58, Appendix F, at 410413, contains a summary of
state regulations of common and contract carriers by motor vehicle; the existing state
findings may be useful in determining in each given case whether a particular carrier
is operating on a regular route or schedule.
62. Id. at 282, 295, 296, 298, 356, 370, 371.
63. Id. at 371. The author is privileged to quote the following from a letter addressed
to him on April 10, 1934, by Mr. V. A. Zimmer, Director of the Division of Workmen's
Compensation of the New York Department of Labor:
"An employer corporation domiciled in New Jersey operates a fleet of trucks in New
Jersey, Pennsylvania and New York engaged in gathering milk and bringing it to a receiving
station in Brooklyn. The employer recognizing his responsibility for compensation cover-
age instructed his broker to secure a policy. It developed however, that the New Jersey
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the interstate operators, who are less subject to state supervision; 6" typi-
cally, both truck and bus companies are small units.65 Yet these opera-
tions have a serious effect not only upon the operating and financial
problems of railroads,6 6 but also upon wages and conditions of employ-
ment for rail workers." The Interstate Commerce Commission suggests
the desirability of uniform regulation by Congress to assure safety and
convenience in the motor transport field."
Aircraft transportation is not at present of prime importance in the
national economy, though itmay be expected to be of increasing sig-
carriers declined the risk because of uncertainty of the extra territorial liability. Thereupon
the broker applied to the New York State Insurance Fund. The management however,
expressed the opinion that there was probably no liability existing for New York State
coverage and therefore declined to issue a policy unless this Department or the Depart-
ment of Law would supply an opinion that New York State liability was indicated.
"The practical difficulty about this procedure is the fact that neither the Industrial
Commissioner nor the Department of Law can properly undertake to give a coverage
opinion as to the coverage obligation of a private employer for two reasons. First, because
such opinion would not be binding upon the Industrial Board or the courts in any actual
case later presented and further because a slight variation in the facts would render such
opinion inapplicable. Hence all that this Department can tell the broker in this dilemma
is that we would not attempt to enforce coverage under the mandatory provision of our
Act because in any criminal prosecution for failure to provide coverage we would not be
in a position to prove to the satisfaction of the court that coverage responsibility clearly
exists.
"Despite the fact that the higher courts of this state have passed upon a number of
cases involving coverage obligation of employers engaged in interstate commerce, the
truth is that there still exists great uncertainty as to what the ruling would be in any
given set of facts such as set forth by this broker...
"As the broker points out, even if the employer secures Jersey coverage it may well be
that an employee who happens to be injured in New York State may file a claim under
our Act because of the more liberal benefits prevailing under our statute. The insur-
ance carrier would, of course, resist the claim because he has received a premium based
upon the New Jersey Act and experience and it might well be that if the courts sustained
the claim the employer might be held liable and his New Jersey carrier released. In this
event the employer would be a non insurer and therefore subject to a penalty for a mis-
demeanor as well as burdened with the liability for payment of the award. To be entirely
on the safe side it would seem that such an employer would be forced to take coverage in
all three states. This involves an extraordinary and unwarranted expense to say nothing
of the complications involved in establishing a separate payroll as a basis of premium
for each of the several carriers. ...
"It seems to me that this case illustrates the desirability of a Federal statute bringing all
interstate commerce carriers within its scope not only to avoid the delay in adjudication
in actual accident or death cases presented, but to eliminate the uncertainty as to coverage
responsibility on the part of employers engaged in this enterprise."
64. Report of I. C. C., supra note 58, at 280.
65. Id. at 276, 279.
66. Id. at 294, 320 et seq.




nificance.69 The present protection afforded by the States to aviation
workers is said to be unsatisfactory, though burdensome upon the in-
dustry.7" Pipe lines carry an important share of all inland traffic7'
and those who are employed in the industry, though it may be assumed
that their actual work is consistently localized, must regularly be occu-
pied interchangeably in interstate and intrastate commerce.72
Adequate safeguards for employees in these several interstate trans-
portation activities are difficult of achievement in the absence of federal
action. Analogous experience need not be ignored by the legislature
in developing a statutory program. The strategic value of a single
program, covering all competing interests, is obvious; it should not be
sacrificed in favor of piecemeal treatment of the problem.
CONCLUSION
The present state of legislation is unsatisfactory. Amendment of
the existing scheme, while curative of some glaring defects, would not
serve to further the modern social policy regarding compensation for
industrial injuries. The Federal Employers' Liability Act, however
much refurbished, would continue to condition redress upon the em-
ployer's fault, rather than upon the fact of loss to the worker and the
community. Application to interstate transportation of local workmen's
compensation acts, on the other hand, seems presently undesirable
because of disparity among the various state laws and because of the
probable high cost of securing insurance coverage.
An immediately effective system is at hand, however, in the scheme
for an inclusive federal act. Rigid distinctions between interstate and
69. See Strong, Recent Changes in American Transportation and the Future of Trans-
port by Air (1931) 7 DEL. NOTES 79, especially at 88-96.
70. See Pillsbury, Application of Federal Compensation Acts to Aviation (1933) 4
Am L. REv. 38, 45. The classifications of employments in the aviation industry are
generally analogous to those in the rail transport industry, and the interrelationship of
inter- and intrastate activities is of the same character. Id. at 43-45, and see id. at 39-40.
The licensing of pilots and planes is in fact almost wholly in the hands of the federal
government today, because of the circumstance that aircraft operations are rarely carried
on solely within one state. See MILLxR, INLAND TRANSPORTATION (1933) 713-715.
71. The percentage was estimated to be 5.2 in 1929. Report of the I. C. C., supra note
58, at 403. And see MLLER, op. cit. supra note 70, at 737-745.
72. Eureka Pipe Line Co. v. Hallanan, 257 U. S. 265 (1921); United Fuel Gas Co. v.
Hallanan, 257 U. S. 277 (1921); State Tax Commission v. Interstate Natural Gas Co., 284
U. S. 41 (1931), show the practical difficulty of isolating the intrastate portion of pipe
line contents, even when the lines are mere "gatherers" within a state. Cf. Atlantic Coast
Line Ry. Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 275 U. S. 257 (1927). The same difficulty, it may be
expected, would attach to determining whether at any given time (such as the time of
injury) one who was occupied in maintaining or operating pipeline facilities was or was
not employed in interstate commerce.
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intrastate commerce must give way before compelling practical con-
siderations. The distressing results of the present law are apparent.
A court will hesitate long before it denounces as unwarranted a legis-
lative conclusion that a workmen's compensation law like that to be
proposed by Senator Wagner has no relation to the safety of goods and
persons carried in interstate transportation or to the safety of the
employees 73 who are indispensable, as a body, to that transportation.
73. A workmen's compensation act might well stimulate greater accident-prevention
efforts, especially in connection with the construction or maintenance of way, structures,
and rolling stock, where the influence of safety legislation is less directly felt than in the
actual operation of trains. "Nontrain accidents" furnish a very large percentage of
annual railroad casualties reported to the Interstate Commerce Commission. See Accident
Bull. No. 98 (I. C. C., Bur. of Statistics, 1930) 69; Id. No. 99 (1931) 65; Id. No. 100
(1932) 65; Id. No. 101 (1933) 46; and see LAUCK, Occu'ATioN HAZARD OF UNSKIDLED
EALPLOYEES ON TnHE RAiLROADS (1921). A connection between the safety of employees
and the safety of passengers is suggested by the rough correspondence between the fluctua-
tions in the figures of those killed or injured in the two groups. See Accident Bull. No.
101, supra note 51, at 81, Statement No. 1.
